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This study examines the interactive effects of family and minority ownership on small 
business debt financing. On one hand, family involvement in ownership has an influence on 
small firm’s financial decision. On the other hand, racial disparities in small business ownership 
make these firms experience differently in credit markets. In the context of family and minority 
involvements, this study measures two dimensions of small business debt financing, one for its 
use, a financing issue directly related to the capital structure, and the other for its cost, an agency 
issue related to the firms’ ability to borrowing and repayment. 
By using the unique data from the 1993, 1998, and 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, 
our empirical results show significant evidence that family involvement has an impact on both 
the use of debt and the cost of debt financing in small businesses. That is, family ownership are 
negatively related to both the use of debt and the cost of debt financing, and when the firms are 
all non-visible minority owned, family firms have a lower level of debt and pay a lower interest 
rate than non-family firms. The results also show that the firm owner’s visible minority are 
positively related to the cost of debt financing, and when these firms are all family owned, 
visible minority owned firms pay a higher interest rate than non-visible minority owned firms.  
These results of our study also have important implications for both small business and 
family business research. For small business owners, it is important to understand the advantages 
and disadvantages of family as well as minority involvements to finance their businesses. And 
for policymakers and institutional lenders, understanding the family and minority effects also 
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Small businesses play a vital role in the economy (Acs and Preston, 1997; Cavalluzzo, 
Cavalluzzo, and Wolken, 2002). Since financing small businesses is different from financing 
large businesses, it is particularly important for small business owners to determine its optimal 
capital structure for their firms. Traditional capital structure theory developed by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) argue about how firms make a decision between debt and equity financing. Since 
then, the theory has been examined through various approaches (Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
Compared to equity financing, debt financing is favored by small businesses, because of the 
existence of the transaction costs and serious information asymmetry problems between them 
and their capital suppliers (Berger and Udell, 1998). As a result, debt financing is one of the main 
sources of capital for small businesses. 
A large part of the theory of debt financing is based on the agency problems associated with 
conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between the firm and its capital suppliers. Due to 
the informational opacity for small business financing, the “lemon” problem suggested by 
Akerlof (1970) incurs both adverse selection and moral hazard for small businesses. That is, the 
adverse selection tends to have the risky borrowers, while moral hazard leads to the increase in 
investing alternative risky projects. One of the possible solutions for these issues is to build a 
relationship between a small firm and its lenders, since a good relationship can assist the lenders 
with the availability of more credible information about the firm (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Berger and Udell, 1995; Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). 
Previous studies (Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios, 2001; Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 
2003; Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004; Chua, Chrisman, Kellermanns, and Wu, forthcoming) 
observe that family involvement may have an influence on small business debt financing. 
According to Anderson et al.’s study (2003), a family business is the one owned by a group of 
family members, while a non-family business is the one with controlling ownership held by a 
group of individuals without family connection. Based on an analysis of financial, family, and 
social factors, Romano et al. (2001) argue that family loans and debt are more likely to be used 
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by small family firms. Moreover, Chua et al. (forthcoming) suggest that family involvement can 
help family firms obtain debt financing through their social capital with lenders, because social 
capital can improve the relationship between the firm and its capital suppliers. However, 
Chrisman et al. (2004) argue that the agency relationship between the firm and its lenders may be 
more severe in small family firms, because the owners and managers in a family firm have the 
great chance to take opportunistic behaviors for their family rather than the firm’s performance.  
Besides the family involvement, previous studies, such as Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 
(1998), Cavalluzzo et al. (2002), Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman (2003), Cavalluzzo and 
Wolken (2005), Fairlie and Robb (2007, 2008), and Robb, Fairlie, and Robinson (2009), provide 
the evidence about the effects of racial disparities on small business debt financing. They show 
empirical evidence that minority owners are less of personal wealth, undercapitalized, and lower 
level of bank loans relative to white owners in small businesses, even after controlling for 
creditworthiness, firm characteristics, and other factors. With a particular view to the credit 
markets, minorities usually have to pay higher interest rates on their loans, and they have higher 
denial rates relative to the whites (i.e., Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; 
Blanchflower et al., 2003; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005). In addition, minorities also have a 
lower of application rates for their loans, because they do not believe they can obtain such loans 
from the bank (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002). Therefore, racial disparities would affect the decision of 
debt financing for small businesses. 
This study uses the data from the 1993, 1998, and 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances 
(SSBF)
1
 to examine the interactive effects of family and minority
2
 ownership on small business 
debt financing. As illustrated as the above, previous studies have already shown the effects of 
family ownership on small business debt financing, as well as the racial effects, this study will 
fill in the gap to explore the interactive effects. These SSBF data were conducted every five 
                                                             
1
 The 1993 survey is in the name of “National Survey of Small Business Finances”.  For more information on 
these surveys, including the methodology reports, technical codebook, survey questionnaire, survey data, and 
bibliography of research using the 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF, see the Federal Reserve Board web site, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/SSBFtoc.htm. 
2
 According to the 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF, the race of minorities included all Black or African-American, 
Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaska Native, and Hispanic. 
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years by the Board of Governance of the Federal Reserve System. We consider the SSBF data set 
as a valid sample for our study because of its high quality in coverage, accuracy, and consistency. 
As well, information provided by the 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF is among the most recent 
publicly available data on small businesses. An important feature of the SSBF data set is that it 
not only includes information on the sample firms’ financial situation, but also focuses on 
information about the characteristics of small businesses and small business owners. These data 
allow us to test for the interactive effects of family ownership and firm owner’s visible minority 
on the use of debt financing and the cost of debt financing.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Our empirical results show significant evidence that family involvement has an impact on 
both the use of debt and the cost of debt financing in small businesses. That is, family ownership 
are negatively related to both the use of debt and the cost of debt financing, and when the firms 
are all non-visible minority owned, family firms have a lower level of debt and pay a lower 
interest rate than non-family firms. The results also show that the firm owner’s visible minority 
are positively related to the cost of debt financing, and when these firms are all family owned, 
visible minority owned firms pay a higher interest rate than non-visible minority owned firms. 
These results of our study also have important implications for both small business and 
family business research. Since family involvement affects both the use of debt and the cost of 
debt financing, research on small businesses cannot ignore the family involvement. For small 
business owners, it is important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of family 
involvement to finance their small businesses. Furthermore, it also can help the policymakers 
and institutional lenders make financing decisions on small business loans based on the analysis 
of family involvement. On the other hand, the indications that the interest rate charged to the 
small business depends on the firm owner’s visible minority imply that small businesses across 
demographic groups experience great differently in credit markets. It advises the visible minority 
owners in small businesses how to get a loan with their racial characteristics. And for 
policymakers and institutional lenders, understanding the racial effects also assists small 
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businesses in obtaining debt financing.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related 
literatures and proposes our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variables used in this 
study. Section 4 presents our methodology and empirical models. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical results and robustness checks for the effects of family ownership and firm owner’s 
























2. Literature Review 
2.1. Agency Theory of Debt Financing 
The finance literature concerning the theory of debt financing is based on the capital 
structure decision, whether a firm finances itself with debt or equity. Capital structure theory 
rooted in Modigliani and Miller (1958) points out that under certain assumptions, a firm’s market 
value is irrelevant to the way it chooses to finance its investments or to distribute dividends. 
Since then, the theory has been examined by different kinds of approaches, such as agency costs 
and information asymmetry (Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
The agency approach focuses on the conflicts of interest among various groups with claims 
to the firm’s resources. First, Jensen and Meckling (1976) study the agency relationship between 
owners and managers. Due to the separation of ownership and management, managers bear the 
entire cost of their investment activities but do not have the 100 percent of the residual claim. As 
a result, manager has the tendency “to appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his 
own consumption” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.12). For example, managers can not only 
simply steal the profits from the firm they control, but also sell the output, assets, or securities to 
another firm they own at a price below market level (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 2000). In addition, managers can expropriate owners by keeping themselves stay on the 
position that they are incompetent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). To solve this agency issue, Jensen 
(1986) suggests that debt payment can reduce the amount of free cash available to managers. If 
the cash flows are poor, this problem can be solved by the benefit of debt financing in the way of 
giving “creditors the option to force the firm into liquidation” (Harris and Raviv, 1990, p.321). 
This will minimize the conflicts of interest and control the managers’ behaviors. 
The next is the agency relationship between debt holders and equity holders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Debt contract allows equity holders to capture most of the gain if 
their investment project is successful, but makes debt holders to bear the consequences if this 
investment project fails (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this case, the shareholders have a strong 
incentive to invest in the risky projects. Myers (1977) argues that issuing risky debt can induce 
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the suboptimal investment opportunities, which reduce the firm’s present market value. To deal 
with this problem, Diamond (1989) considers the firm’s reputation for promised debt repayment. 
When a firm initially seeks the loan from the debt market, it may choose the risky investment 
project due to its little reputation. Over time, when this firm has acquired a better reputation for 
its repayment, it can have a lower borrowing cost for the loan, and thus have the preference to 
choose the safe project. As a consequence, firms have an incentive to pursue relatively safe 
projects in the long run (Diamond, 1989).  
The agency theory of debt financing recommends dealing with the private information in 
capital market that flow from asymmetric information and also the adverse selection effects 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991). Myers and Majluf (1984) discuss the corporate financing and 
investment decisions under the assumption that the managers are well informed about the firm’s 
true value than outside investors. In their model, stock may be mispriced by the market if the 
firm issues equity to finance its investment. However, it would not happen if the firm issues safe 
debt, because debt financing is irrelevant to the firm’s value, no matter it is overvalued or 
undervalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, consistent with the Myers’ (1984) pecking order 
theory, firms have a hierarchy of financing sources and prefer safe securities rather than risky 
ones. The first is the internal financing if available, and then debt is preferred to equity if external 
financing is required.  
Signaling models that can be applied to reduce the adverse selection effects suggest that the 
choice of the firm’s capital structure signals the private inside information to the market. Ross 
(1977) develops an incentive-signaling model and demonstrates that larger debt level is the 
signal of higher firm quality. Since managers know more about the value of a firm’s assets than 
outside investors, investors evaluate the firm’s value based on the signal sent by managers. 
Managers benefit when the firm’s value is overpriced by the market but are penalized when the 
firm goes bankruptcy. Therefore, managers of low quality firms will not issue more debt like the 
ones of high quality firms, because the low quality firms increase the chance of going bankruptcy 
(Ross, 1977).  
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In summary, the agency theory of debt financing under asymmetric information has 
identified numerous potential determinants, and thus has a wealth of implications. Harris and 
Raviv (1991) summarize four properties of debt contract as follows. The first is the bankruptcy 
provision. Under certain conditions, debt makes the takeover of a firm more costly. The second 
implies a convex function between levered equity and its payoffs. The third is the effect of debt 
on managerial equity ownership. On one hand, debt forces manager’s payoffs to be more 
sensitive to their performance in a firm. On the other hand, it concentrates voting power, since 
debt does not carry voting rights while equity does. The last indicates that debt is priced more 
accurately than equity in the market due to the present of asymmetric information. 
2.2. Small Business Debt Financing 
The financing decision of small businesses is different from that of the large public traded 
firms. Since small businesses are usually hard to access to financial market due to their serious 
information asymmetry problems (Scherr and Hulburt, 2001), they prefer to use private financing, 
whereas the large firms can obtain their financing through public sources. Berger and Udell 
(1998) explain why external equity financing is a challenge for small businesses. First, there is a 
significant amount of fixed costs when firms seek the public financing. Second, small businesses 
are more likely to keep private for their transactions with shareholders, suppliers, customers, 
workers, and lenders, since they are not required by law to disclose information to public. As a 
consequence, small businesses heavily rely on internal financing that is provided by families, 
friends, or a start-up team and short-term debt financing.  
Previous studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Elyasiani and 
Goldberg, 2004) find that lending relationship helps a small business obtain short-term debt 
financing from their capital suppliers. At the initial lending relationship, the lender is uncertain 
about the growth opportunities and investment decisions of the small firm, and thus requires a 
higher borrowing rate and more collateral as securities for its loan. After the small firm 
demonstrates its credibility in previous borrowing, it pays a lower interest rate and does not 
pledge collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995). As it keeps a favorable credit appraisal over time, the 
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small firm can obtain long-term debt financing through continuously rolling over short-term 
loans (Diamond, 1989). In short, prior research concludes that a good lending relationship 
benefits a small business from the availability of short-term debt and the feasibility of long-term 
debt financing.  
However, the lending relationship may also create agency problems because of the 
asymmetric information between the firm and its capital suppliers (Myers, 1977; Smith and 
Warner, 1979). Due to the informational opacity for small business financing, the “lemon” 
problem suggested by Akerlof (1970) incurs adverse selection and moral hazard for small 
businesses. Adverse selection occurs when the principal inadvertently employs an agent who 
may be less suitable for the work than the principal expected, while moral hazard occurs when 
the agent intentionally hide information to perform his own interest, which will lead to the harm 
to the principal. Petersen and Rajan (1994, p.3) point out that “funds will always be available to 
firms with positive net present value investment opportunities” under a frictionless credit market. 
However, there is no sufficient fund for small businesses to finance their projects due to the 
market frictions such as adverse selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). That is 
because the borrower concerns about returns on their investments, while the lender cares about 
the interests they charged on the loans (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Therefore, as a consequence of 
asymmetric information, the adverse selection tends to have the risky borrowers, while moral 
hazard leads to the increase in investing in alternative risky projects. 
Berger and Udell (2002) show another agency problem of lending based on the assumption 
that a loan officer is better informed than a bank about the borrower’s true situation. Since a loan 
officer can make lending decisions based on the soft information that is gathered from the 
interaction with the borrower, whereas the bank has the difficulty to observe, verify, and transmit 
such soft information, the loan officer has the opportunity to act in his own interest, which may 
lead to the loss of bank. In addition, the loan officer may have some personal relationship with 




Besides the agency problems between the firm and its capital suppliers, financing also has 
the agency problems between owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and between 
majority and minority shareholders (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988, 1989; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). The latter arises because the large shareholders maximize their own welfare at the 
expense of the remaining minority shareholders’ interests. Especially, Grossman and Hart (1988) 
show that this expropriation is stronger when the large investors have the superior voting stock in 
excess of their cash flow rights, or when the one share-one vote policy cannot be implemented. 
In this case, large shareholders have the power to pay out cash only to themselves, rather than all 
the investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Morck et al. (1988) present the empirical evidence on 
the relationship between cash flow ownership of the larger shareholders and the firm’s market 
valuation by using the Tobin’s Q. They find that the firm’s value increases with the management 
ownership in a range of 0 to 5 percent, and then declines until the ownership rises up to 25 
percent. One explanation of such phenomenon is that, the improved performance “reflect the 
convergence of interests between managers and shareholders” (Morck et al., 1988, p.312), while 
the decline reflect that the large shareholders have gained entire control so that they can “use 
firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders” 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.759).  
To solve these agency problems, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest several corporate 
governance mechanisms including monitoring and signaling. Ever since Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), monitoring mechanisms are supervised by the principal. For instance, the board of 
directors is mainly responsible for monitoring the top manager’s behaviors (Fama and Jensen, 
1983), while only large shareholders have the powerful incentive to monitor managers, which 
results in the free rider problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The signaling mechanisms convey 
information about the firm from insiders to outside investors (Spence, 1973; Ross, 1977; Sobel, 
1985), which best resolve the asymmetric information. 
2.3. Family Businesses 
Family businesses have been observed dominance of the economic landscape in most 
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countries (Sharma, 2004). As illustrated by Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003), a family business 
is the one owned by a group of family members, while a non-family business is the one with 
controlling ownership held by a group of individuals without family connection. At this point, a 
firm with a sole owner may not be regarded as a family firm, because there is no related family 
member working in this kind of firms. Anderson et al. (2003, p.267) suggest two important 
aspects to separate family firms from non-family firms: “the family’s interest in the firm’s 
long-term survival and the family’s concern for the firm’s (family’s) reputation”. They explain 
the reasons as follows. First, family firms are more likely to maximize firm value rather than the 
return to shareholders, because of their aim to pass the firm rather than the wealth to their heirs. 
This will mitigate the conflicts of interest between debt holders and equity holders. Thus, 
Anderson et al. (2003) expect a lower cost of debt in family firms rather than in non-family firms. 
Second, family firms have the incentive to maintain favorable reputations relative to non-family 
firms, because the managers in family firms are more stable than those in non-family firms. Such 
family’s reputation creates longer lasting economic consequences for the firms (Anderson et al., 
2003). 
Agency issues in family firms are different from those in non-family firms, mainly because 
of the characteristic of altruism in family firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, 2001; 
Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003). In a family business perspective, “altruism is 
self-reinforcing and motivated by self-interest because it allows the individual to simultaneously 
satisfy both altruistic (other-regarding) preferences and egotistic (self-regarding) preferences” 
(Schulze et al., 2001, p.102). On one hand, altruism fosters loyalty, commitment, and a sense of 
belonging in a family firm (Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2003). It not only guarantees 
children to succeed to the family firm from their parents, but also takes care of every family 
member in the firm. On the other hand, altruism gives the opportunities for both parents and 
children to destroy the firm’s value for their own interests (Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 
2003). Both of them have an effect on the agency issues of family firms. 
Traditional points of view in the literature (Becker, 1974; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
11 
 
and Jensen, 1983) suggest that family involvement can reduce the agency problems, because of 
the concentration of substantial decision and cash flow rights in family firms, or family firm 
member’s personal satisfaction from the success of organization (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). Taking 
family altruism into consideration, Karra, Tracey, and Phillips (2006) show that family firms 
have lower agency costs, because altruism aligns the interests of family members, providing it is 
reciprocal and symmetrical between family owners and family managers. In addition, Chrisman 
et al. (2004, p.337) suggest that “family firms are the least costly and more efficient form of 
organization”. One of the special cases is that the sole owner-managed firm has zero agency cost 
(Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000).  
However, family firms may be vulnerable to the agency problems, since “a family is not a 
monolithic or homogeneous group of people with congruent interests, nor are all family 
businesses identical with respect to organizational characteristics and behaviors” (Chrisman et al., 
2004, p.338). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) emphasize that family firms are 
internal dysfunction owing to controlling shareholders’ autonomy in decision making. Schulze et 
al. (2001) and Schulze et al. (2003) show a tendency of altruism also create the agency problems 
in family firms due to “free riding, biased parental perception of a child’s performance, difficulty 
in enforcing a contract, and generosity in terms of perquisite consumption” (Chrisman et al., 
2005, p.560). Schulze et al. (2001) and Schulze et al. (2003) argue that family relationship make 
it more difficult to resolve these agency issues.  
Since family firms have both economic and non-economic goals in reality (Chrisman et al., 
2004, 2005), the agency problems in family firms are more complicated. For example, when an 
owner wants to pursue some non-economic goal and managers are also willing to do it, there 
may be less economic performance but no agency cost in the firm. This will reduce the agency 
costs between owners and managers, especially in terms of monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Ang et al., 2000). However, the agency relationships between majority and minority shareholders 
may be serious in family firms if the minority shareholders are not part of the family (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). This is because family members, as a special class of large shareholders, have a 
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powerful voice in the family firms (Anderson et al., 2003).  
As to the relationship between the firm and its capital suppliers, family involvement has an 
influence on the firm’s financing decision and thus related to the agency problems of debt 
financing for small businesses. Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios (2001) explore the financing 
decisions of small firms in a family business perspective. They suggest that family firm’s 
financing decision is influenced by a complex array of financial, family, and social factors. They 
also explain that family loans and debt are more likely to be used by small family firms in which 
“owners’ interest in retaining control and choosing to set limits on gearing because of risk factors 
and beliefs that disadvantages of stock exchange listing outweigh its advantages” (Romano et al., 
2001, p.303).  
Chrisman et al. (2004) argue the agency relationship between the firm and its lender may be 
more severe in small family firms due to the following two reasons. First, lenders need to put a 
great deal of time and efforts into analyzing and monitoring a small firm’s behaviors, but such 
actions cannot be justified on the grounds of the returns to lenders. Second, the owners and 
managers in a family firm have a greater chance to take opportunistic behaviors for their family 
rather than the firm’s performance. Therefore, family involvement increases the agency costs of 
debt financing for small businesses. In this case, Chrisman et al. (2004) suggest that a strategic 
business plan of small firms can be used to reduce these agency costs, because “there would be 
better communication and an explicit plan against which the lender can evaluate the firm’s 
performance” (p.348).  
Furthermore, Chua et al. (forthcoming) argue that such external debt financing can be 
obtained by small family businesses through their social capital with lenders, because social 
capital can improve the relationship between the firm and its capital suppliers. Social capital, 
defined by its function, is “the ongoing interdependence and interactions among individuals and 
the mutual trust they develop in terms of their ability to predict behaviors, the perceived 
commonality of goals, and the potential for an equitable exchange of resources over time” (Chua 
et al., 2009, p.3). Arregle, Hitt, Simon, and Very (2007) show that how family social capital can 
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be used to create the family firm’s social capital. In their model, a small firm may not have 
enough social capital at the initial stage, so it has to use personal social capital, or borrow other 
person’s social capital. However, the other’s social capital is not easy to obtain. It happens only 
when the small firm has a good relationship with the owners of the social capital, especially in 
terms of trust and mutual obligation (Chua et al., forthcoming). At this point, family involvement 
should make the family firm easier to borrow social capital from family members, and thus to 
achieve the higher level of debt financing. 
In this process, social capital also helps mitigate the conflicts of interest between the family 
firm and its lender (Chua et al., forthcoming). This is because borrowed family social capital 
cannot only improve the relationship between family firm and its lender, but also increase the 
probability of a lender receiving a third party guarantee, which in turn to reduce the agency costs 
of lending (Chua et al., forthcoming). Moreover, Chua et al. (forthcoming) suggest that family 
involvement should make family members more willing to lend their family social capital to 
family firm, due to both the alignment of interests between family members and family firms and 
the reduction in information asymmetry. The greater the firm has the ability to borrow family 
social capital, the better the firm has a relationship with its lender, and the more debt financing it 
can obtain. Even in a public firm, founding family ownership results in a lower agency cost of 
debt. Anderson and Reeb (2003) provide the empirical evidence to support it. Therefore, family 
involvement may reduce the agency problems between the firm and its lender with the help of 
social capital. 
2.4. Racial Effects 
Among the owner’s characteristics related to business capital structure, race seems to have a 
strong influence on a small firm’s ability to access to financial capital in its whole lifecycle 
(Robb et al., 2009). Previous studies (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; 
Blanchfouwer et al., 2003; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005; Fairlie and Robb, 2008; Robb et al., 
2009) indicate that minority owners are less of personal wealth, undercapitalized, and lower level 
of bank loans relative to white owners in small businesses. In particular, Robb et al. (2009) show 
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that low levels of personal wealth as well as lower level of credit score in black owned 
businesses decrease the firm’s ability to obtain bank loans, because bank will use this wealth as 
collateral to make the firm’s lending decision. Furthermore, such low levels of startup capital 
will influence the small firm’s long term performance (Robb et al., 2009). It results the black 
owned businesses have a lower of success ratio than white owned businesses, and so have the 
less “wealth accumulation, economic advancement and job creation” (Robb et al., 2009, p.3). 
Therefore, the minority owned firms have more difficulties than white owned firms in the growth 
and development due to their weak initial situation.  
Due to the lack of startup capital, the minority owned firms have to seek for external 
financing. However, it is difficult for them to obtain financial capital owning to lending 
discrimination. Early study by Becker (1971, p.14) explains that an individual with a taste for 
discrimination is willing to “pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to 
be associated with some persons instead of others”. Applying Becker’s discrimination idea into 
credit markets, racial disparities between minorities and whites lead to the minorities 
experiencing “higher cost or tougher lending standard” in their loan application (Cavalluzzo et 
al., 2002, p.677). For example, minorities have to pay higher interest rates on their loans, and 
they have higher denial rates relative to the whites. Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998), 
Cavalluzzo et al. (2002), Blanchflower et al. (2003), Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005), and Robb et 
al. (2009) all provide the empirical evidence on lending discrimination to support this idea, even 
after controlling for personal wealth, creditworthiness, firm characteristics, and other factors. In 
addition, minorities also have a lower of application rates for their loans, because they do not 
believe they can obtain such loans from the bank (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002).  
Besides the lending discrimination, Fairlie and Robb (2007) explore the racial disparities in 
small business outcomes based on the family business background. Generally, the business 
outcomes are worse in minority owned firms than those in white owned firms, in terms of lower 
sales and profits, fewer employment, higher closure rates among minority owned firms (Bitler, 
Robb, and Wolken, 2001; Robb, 2002; Mach and Wolken, 2006; Fairlie and Robb, 2007). When 
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it comes to family business background, the intergenerational transmission may play an 
important role in contributing to racial disparities, not only in the business ownership, but also in 
business outcomes (Fairlie and Robb, 2007). Using data from the 1992 Characteristics of 
Business Owners survey, Fairlie and Robb (2007) find that whether having a self-employed 
family member owner prior to business startup does not help explain the racial differences in 
business outcomes, even the black owned firms are less likely to have self-employed family 
members relative to the white owned firms. Instead, they find that either the lack of previous 
work experience in a family business or the lack of previous work experience in a similar 
business among black business owners limits their opportunities for the acquisition of general 
business and specific human capital, which leads to the worse outcomes in black owned firms. 
Therefore, the racial disparities in previous work experiences are one of the main factors to result 
in the different business outcomes, other factors include the racial disparities in education level, 
geographic location, startup capital, and so on (Fairlie and Robb, 2007). 
2.5. Research Hypotheses 
As the above literature review shows, not only family involvement, but also racial disparity 
in business ownership has an influence on firm’s financial decision. In a small business setting, 
the business ownership can be owned by a family, or a visible minority, or both. If the small firm 
is owed by a family, and the family belongs to certain minority group, the firm’s financial 
behavior will be affected by both family ownership and firm owner’s visible minority. Otherwise, 
the family ownership, or the presence of minority in business ownership would solely fashion the 
small businesses’ financial decisions.  
Previous studies focus on the small business debt financing from various aspects. In the 
view of family ownership, Romano et al. (2001), Anderson et al. (2003), Chrisman et al. (2004), 
and Chua et al. (2009) examine the effects of family involvement on firm’s financial decision 
based on the agency theory. They illustrate that family ownership has a mixed effect on the 
agency cost of debt. On one hand, family involvement in ownership may increase the agency 
conflicts between the firm and its lender due to the information asymmetry. On the other hand, 
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the agency cost of debt financing can be reduced by the presence of family ownership, because 
of the convergence of interests between family members and family firms. Whereas Cavalluzzo 
and Cavalluzzo (1998), Cavalluzzo et al. (2002), Blanchflower et al. (2003), Cavalluzzo and 
Wolken (2005), Fairlie and Robb (2007, 2008), and Robb et al. (2009) provide the evidence on 
the effects of racial disparities, not only on startup capital, as well as the following capital 
injections, but also on business performance and outcomes. In particular for family business 
background, minority owned firms have more disadvantages than white owned firms, such as the 
lack of previous work experiences in black owned firms (Fairlie and Robb, 2007). Among all 
these studies on small business debt financing, either the family ownership or racial disparity can 
have an influence on the firm’s financial decision.  
This study attempts to explore the small business debt financing in the context of both 
family ownership and racial effects. We do not only expect the direct effects by any one of 
family ownership or racial disparity, just like what the previous literatures have shown, but also 
expect the effects by the interactions between family ownership and firm owner’s visible 
minority, which will help fill in the gap in this line of literature. Based on two dimensions of 
small business debt financing, one for its use, a financing issue directly related to the capital 
structure, and the other for its cost, an agency issue related to the firms’ ability to borrowing and 
repayment, this study attempts to examine two sets of hypotheses as follows. 
Set one for the use of debt financing: 
Hypothesis 1: The use of debt financing is positively related to family ownership in small 
businesses. 
Hypothesis 2: The use of debt financing is negatively related to the firm owner’s visible 
minority in small businesses. 
Hypothesis 3a: Given all the firms are non-visible minority owned, family firms are more 
likely to use debt financing than non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 3b: Given all the firms are visible minority owned, family firms are more likely 
to use debt financing than non-family firms. 
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Hypothesis 4a: Given all the firms are family owned, visible minority owned firms are less 
likely to use debt financing than non-visible minority owned firms. 
Hypothesis 4b: Given all the firms are non-family owned, visible minority owned firms are 
less likely to use debt financing than non-visible minority owned firms. 
Set two for the cost of debt financing: 
Hypothesis 5: The cost of debt financing is negatively related to family ownership in small 
businesses. 
Hypothesis 6: The cost of debt financing is positively related to the firm owner’s visible 
minority in small businesses. 
Hypothesis 7a: Given all the firms are non-visible minority owned, family firms are charged 
a lower cost of debt financing than non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 7b: Given all the firms are visible minority owned, family firms are charged a 
lower cost of debt financing than non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 8a: Given all the firms are family owned, visible minority owned firms are 
charged a higher cost of debt financing than non-visible minority owned firms. 
Hypothesis 8b: Given all the firms are non-family owned, visible minority owned firms are 













3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Data 
The data used for this study were drawn from the 1993, 1998, and 2003 Survey of Small 
Business Finances (SSBF). These survey data were conducted every five years by the Board of 
Governance of the Federal Reserve System. Each of the survey populations was a nationally 
representative sample of the U.S. small businesses that had 500 or fewer employees
3
. Based on 
the minimum eligibility requirements
4
 by the Federal Reserve Board, the sample of this study 
has 12,434 firms, as a sum of 4,633 firms which represented 4.99 million small businesses in 
1993, and 3,561 firms which represented 5.3 million small businesses in 1998, and 4,240 firms 
which represented 6.3 million small businesses in 2003 (1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF Technical 
Codebooks). 
The SSBF data set is a stratified random sample
5
. It does not only provide information on 
the sample firms’ financial situation, such as their income statement and balance sheet, their use 
of financial products and services, and the recent credit applying as well as their credit history, 
but also focus on the information about the characteristics of small businesses and small business 
owners, such as the employment size, geographic location, the number of small business owners, 
and the owners’ race, ethnicity, and gender6. All of them cover a wealth of information on small 
                                                             
3
 The 1993 survey measured the employment as the sum of full-time owners and employees and half of part-time 
owners and employees working in the firm. However, the 1998 and 2003 surveys measured the employment as the 
number of owners and employees working in the firm, no matter the owners and employees were full- or part-time. 
In this case, we adjusted the measurement of total employees in the 1993 survey to be consistent with those in the 
1998 and 2003 surveys, which made four firms having more than 500 employees out of 4,637 in the 1993 survey. 
4
 The 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF technical codebooks explain the target population definition as follows. First, 
these firms were all for-profit, nonfinancial, nonfarm, and non-subsidiary businesses. Second, these firms operated 
in the year-end 1993, 1998, and 2003, respectively. Third, there was no erroneous frame data for each of the firms in 
these surveys. All of these criteria made these surveys to have around 60 to 70 eligibility rates of sampled 
businesses. 
5 
Each 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF data set is a stratified random sample with over sampling identified by 
employment size groups, urban or rural location, and census regions. Additionally, the 1993 and 1998 SSBF 
identified over sampling of firms as being owned by minority groups, including African Americans, Asians, 
Hispanics, and others. Each of the minority groups was proportionately stratified by urban or rural location, or 
employment size groups, urban and rural location, and census regions. 
6
 Information collected by the Federal Reserve Board is a few different in each survey. For detailed illustration and 





More specifically, the survey data also aggregate some information from the original 
variables within the questionnaires. Such information are included in the variables generated 
from combining variables, the variables derived from combinations of other variables, the 
variables moved from one section to another in order to facilitate the analysis, the variables 
obtained from other sources more than the interviews, and the shadow variables which indicated 
the quality of information (1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF Technical Codebooks). For example, the 
variable for the weighted percentage of minority ownership is the one derived from the weighted 
average of each individual minority owner’s percentage of the ownership share. The shadow 
variables are a particular set of variables that indicate how each value of variables came from. In 
other words, the shadow variables represent whether the variables were originally reported, 
imputed for missing, or legitimately skipped.  
However, not all the firms had the entire set of information in the survey data. To guarantee 
the data quality, the Federal Reserve Board staffs had build a series of criteria that had to be 
satisfied by each firm in order to be considered to complete their surveys since 1998. First, an 
individual firm had to answer at least 75 percent of all the questions. Second, an individual firm 
had to answer at least 75 percent of questions regarding their income statement and balance sheet. 
For example, in a question for a dollar dominated response, an actual dollar amount, or an 
estimate of the amount, was accepted, but a range of the amount was treated as missing data. 
Third, there was no missing data on information about whether a firm used various kinds of 
financial services. In other words, the firm had to respond to such questions as whether it had 
checking accounts, saving accounts, credit cards, lines of credit, leases, mortgages, motor vehicle 
loans, equipment loans, loans from partners or stockholders, or other loans, as well as whether it 
had applied for the recent loan and whether the loan had been approved if applicable. Given 
these completeness criteria, no more than 350 borderline cases in total were reviewed by the 
Federal Reserve Board staffs. It made the overall response rate around 32 to 33 percent (1998 
and 2003 SSBF Technical Codebooks). 
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Furthermore, the survey data were edited and imputed by the Federal Reserve Board staffs 
to make sure the accuracy and consistency of the data. Additional information from diverse 
sources was provided to assist the staffs in the adjustment of data. For example, there were 600 
firms in 1993, 1,940 firms in 1998, and 1,320 firms in 2003, respectively, that submitted their 
hard-copy records, such as filled-out worksheets, accounting statements, or tax forms, to help 
check and confirm the accuracy of data (1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF Technical Codebooks). 
This led the information in the income statement and balance sheet to satisfy the requirements by 
accounting identities, which guaranteed the data accuracy and consistency. Moreover, the data 
were also examined and adjusted between source name, type, location, and other specific 
sections in the questionnaires, based on sufficient information. 
In particular, the Federal Reserve Board staffs imputed the missing data by using some 
randomized regression models. For instance, a randomized linear-probability model was used for 
the missing values in the multiple-categorical response questions, while a randomized hot-deck 
procedure was used for the discrete categorical responses. In these regressions, the imputation 
process might be run up to three times to achieve the ideal imputation values (1993, 1998, and 
2003 SSBF Technical Codebooks). As a result, one fully imputed data set was provided by each 
1993 and 1998 SSBF, while five fully imputed data sets were provided by the 2003 SSBF. In the 
2003 survey data, each set of data contains 4,240 firm observations; and across these sets, the 
values of all reported variables are identical, whereas the values of imputed variables might 
differ in the five different sets. These five sets of data provide an opportunity to analyze for the 
different estimations. In our study, one of the five data sets was chosen to compose our final fully 
1993, 1998, and 2003 data. 
In sum, the SSBF data set is a valid sample for our study on small business debt financing, 
due to its high quality in coverage, accuracy, and consistency. As well, information provided by 
the 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF is among the most recent publicly available data on small 
businesses, since the public versions of these surveys were released in the year of 1999, 2001, 
and 2007, respectively. It is noted that each of the surveys has only one year observations on the 
21 
 
sampled small businesses. Thus our whole sample contains three discrete year observations of 
variables. With the comprehensive information provided by each 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF, 
this study uses the survey data to examine the interactive effects of family ownership and firm 
owner’s visible minority on small business debt financing. 
3.2. Dependent Variables 
Two layers of debt financing information for small businesses are examined: the variable 
USE OF DEBT as measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets
7
, and the variable COST 
OF DEBT as measured by the fixed nominal interest rate that the firm paid at the time of issue of 
its most recent loan in the past three years. To ensure the accuracy of the data, we excluded 
observations that reported negative assets, because their representations in the income statement 
and balance sheet were suspect. Additional observations were omitted if the fixed nominal 
interest rate was reported as zero. 
3.3. Independent Variables 
Since this study focuses on the effects of family ownership, those of firm owner’s visible 
minority, and those of the interactions between these two factors on small business debt 
financing, several independent variables are used for the estimations. The first variable FAMILY 
is a dummy variable with the value of one if the firm was family owned and zero otherwise. 
Based on the 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF, it was considered a family owned firm if the firm was 
more than 50 percent owned by a single family
8
.  
The second variable MINORITY is also a dummy variable with the value of one if the firm 
was owned by visible minorities and zero otherwise. A firm was considered a visible minority 
owned if the firm was more than 50 percent owned by individuals who were visible minorities. It 
is noted that information about the firm owners in the 2003 SSBF is different from those 
                                                             
7 An alternative measure for the use of debt financing is the ratio of total interest bearing liabilities to total assets, 
where the value of total interest bearing liabilities is calculated by total liabilities minus accounts receivable and 
trade notes. This measure excludes the effects of trade credit on debt financing. However, it is difficult to distinguish 
the effects of debt from the effects of trade credit due to the complicated transactions resulting from the use of trade 
credit. Thus, this study would not separate out the effects of trade credit on debt financing.  
8 The 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF also regarded a firm that had only one owner as a family firm. In this case, this 
study will deal with both of the family issues with and without the sole owner firms. 
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collected in the 1993 and 1998 SSBF. The previous 1993 and 1998 surveys collected information 
only for the owners with the largest shared ownership, whereas the 2003 survey collected 
information for three owners who had the largest shared ownership and reported the 
characteristics of them one by one. Thus, the 2003 survey provides additional details on specific 
owners and the organizational structure of a firm. In this case, an alternative measure, 
MINORITY2, is constructed for 2003 data only. It has the value of one if the principal owner of 
a firm was a visible minority, and zero otherwise.  
On the basis of the interactions between family ownership and firm owner’s visible minority, 
four aggregated dummy variables are created: FBVM, FBNONVM, NONFBVM, and 
NONFBNONVM. They represent that the firm was both family and visible minority owned; the 
firm was family owned, but not visible minority owned; the firm was visible minority owned, but 
not family owned; and the firm was neither family nor visible minority owned, respectively. 
Each of them has the value of one if its representation was true and zero otherwise. Since the 
2003 SSBF has two sets of visible minority variables, it also aggregates two sets of interaction 
variables. The alternative group includes the variables FBVM2, FBNONVM2, NONFBVM2, 
and NONFBNONVM2. 
3.4. Control Variables 
Five dimensions of control variables are included to capture the information about various 
aspects of the firms in the sample. These five groups of variables are agency variables, firm 
characteristics variables, firm owner attributes variables, most recent loan characteristics 
variables, and other control variables. 
3.4.1. Agency Variables 
Previous studies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Ross, 1977; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Sobel, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997) suggest that monitoring and signaling are 
two main tools for reducing the agency problems generated by agency costs and information 
asymmetry between two parties to a contract. Monitoring is measured by two variables. The first 
variable OWNMANAGE is a dummy variable with the value of one if there was at least one 
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owner responsible for the daily management of the business and zero otherwise. The second 
variable OWNERSHARE indicates the percentage ownership held by the principal owner. These 
are consistent with the previous studies (Berger and Udell, 1995; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; 
Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005). Alternatively, the 2003 SSBF provides another two variables for 
measuring the monitoring. The dummy variable OWNMAMAGE2 indicates whether the 
principal owner was also the manager of the firm. The variable OWNERSHARE2 is a dummy 
variable with the value of one if any one individual or company owned 10 percent or more of the 
shares in this firm and zero otherwise. 
In addition, two types of signaling variables are used to measure signals sent by borrowers. 
The dummy variable USEOWNERCC indicates whether the firm used owner’s personal credit 
cards to pay business expenses. It provides “a strong signal to other stakeholders regarding the 
firm owner’s financial and psychological attachment to the business” (Wu, Chua, and Chrisman, 
2007, p.882). The other dummy variable FINSTATEMENT indicates whether the financial 
statements or accounting reports for the firm were audited. It signals the credibility of the 
information provided by small firms. 
As a good relationship between small business and its lender could increase the availability 
of funds and reduce the cost of lending to small business (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and 
Udell, 1995), the variable RELATION is included to measure the length of a firm had conducted 
business with its lender at the time of application for its most recent loan. Since the length of 
relationship provided by the 1993 SSBF was in years, while those from the 1998 and 2003 SSBF 
were in months, we adjusted the variable in 1993 to have the same unit as the one in 1998 and 
2003 by multiplying by twelve for consistency. Moreover, since a local lender could have better 
information about the small business’ quality and market prospects (Berger and Udell, 2002), the 
distance between the firm’s headquarter and its lender may also have an influence on the loan 
application. Thus the variable DISTANCE is included to indicate the distance in miles from the 
firm to its lender. 
3.4.2. Firm Characteristics Variables 
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Following the previous studies (Berger and Udell, 1998; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; 
Romano et al., 2001; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Blanchflower et al., 2003; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 
2005), firm characteristics influence the small business financing. These variables include 
FIRMAGE, measuring the firm’s age at the time of each survey, EMPLOYEES, representing the 
total number of owners and employees working in the firm, and OWNERS, representing the 
number of owners in the firm
9
. Since a firm’s ownership structure may have to do with “the 
amount of private information that borrowers have, the risks that borrowers take, and the ability 
of borrowers to shift risk to the bank and other fixed-claim holders” (Berger and Udell, 1995, 
p.359), three dummy variables SOLEPROP, PARTNERSHIP, and CORPRATION are created for 
the legal form of a firm. Each of these variables has the value of one if the firm was organized as 
a sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation, respectively, and zero otherwise. Additional 
information emphasizes the firm’s geographic location. The dummy variable METROPOLITAN 
indicates the main office of the firm was in a rural or metropolitan, owing to the economic 
advantages in metropolitan markets (Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005). Its value is one if the main 
office of the firm was in a metropolitan area and zero otherwise. Since the firm may have more 
than one office, the variable SITES is used to indicate the number of sites that a firm had, and the 
variable SAMESITES indicates the number of sites that a firm had in the same area as its main 
office.  
Other important firm characteristics are about the firm’s financial information. The variable 
ASSETS indicates the dollar amount of total assets of a firm, and the variable LNASSETS is 
computed by the natural logarithm of the sum of total assets plus one, measuring the size of the 
firm, since size has been shown to affect the small firm’s financial decision (Berger and Udell, 
1998; Romano et al., 2001; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002). Moreover, consistent with the previous 
studies (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 
2005), we also include two variables PROFASSETS and SALEASSETS, which are computed by 
the ratio of profits to total assets, and the ratio of sales to total assets, respectively. Both of them 
                                                             
9
 To ensure the accuracy of the data, we excluded eleven observations that reported zero owners in the 1993 SSBF 
data, because their representations in businesses were suspect. 
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suggest that the higher the ratios are, the more efficient the firm uses its business assets.  
Furthermore, we add the Dum and Bradstreet credit score (DBSCORE) from the 1998 and 
2003 SSBF to assist in evaluating a firm’s credit worth (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Blanchflower et 
al., 2003; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005). The scores provided by Dum and Bradstreet are from 
“a multitude of sources, including a firm’s past experiences with banks, public utility payment 
histories, and trade experiences with other firms” (Blanchflower et al., 2003, p. 932). Different 
from the original Dum and Bradstreet credit score ranged from 0 to 100, the variable DBSCORE 
has the value from one to five in the 1998 SSBF and one to six in the 2003 SSBF. According to 
the 2003 SSBF, the value of one indicates the scores from 0 to 10, and the following values from 
two to six indicate the scores from 11 to 25, from 26 to 50, from 51 to 75, from 76 to 90, and 
from 91 to 100, respectively. In this case, a firm has the most risky of credit if its value is one, 
while a firm has the least risky of credit if its value is six. To keep a consistent measurement of 
the variable DBSCORE in our study, we adjusted this variable in the 1998 SSBF as follows: the 
value of one represents high risk, and the following values from two to five represent significant 
risk, average risk, moderate risk, and low risk, respectively. 
3.4.3. Owner Attributes Variables 
The owner’s personal attributes have stronger influence on firm’s financial decision in small 
businesses than that in large public firms (Wu et al., 2007). Consistent with the previous studies 
(Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Romano et al., 2001; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Blanchflower 
et al., 2003; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005; Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Wu et al., 2007; Robb et al., 
2009), we include several important attributes of the owners as follows. The first variable 
FEMALE is a dummy variable with the value of one if the firm was female owned and zero 
otherwise. Similar to the definitions for the independent variable MINORITY, a female owned 
firm is also defined in two ways by the 2003 SSBF. The variable FEMALE is defined if the firm 
was more than 50 percent owned by individuals who were female, and the variable FEMALE2 is 
defined if the principal owner of the firm was a female.  
Other control variables representing owner attributes include OWNERAGE, measuring the 
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age of the principal owner, EXPERIENCE, indicating how many years of experience the 
principal owner has had managing or owning a business, and the principal owner’s highest 
education level. Based on the 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF, the education level is divided into 
five dummy variables: NOTFINIHS, HIGHSCHDIP, COLLEGE, BACHELORDEG, and 
POSTGRAD, which indicate the principal owner’s highest education level was lower than high 
school degree, high school graduated or equivalent, some college or training school but no 
degree granted, bachelor degree like BA, BS, AB, etc., and post graduate degree like MBA, MS, 
MA, Phd, JD, MD, DDS, etc., respectively. Since the 2003 SSBF interviewed the characteristics 
of three owners in a firm, it generates the average age, work experience, and education level of 
owners in a firm. We use the variables OWNERAGE2, EXPERIENCE2, NOTFINIHS2, 
HIGHSCHDIP2, COLLEGE2, BACHELORDEG2, and POSTGRAD2 to stand for these 
characteristics. Each of the variables is a weighted average of the characteristics of three 
individual owners weighted by their ownership shares. 
In addition, the dummy variable OWNHOME is derived from the 1998 and 2003 SSBF. Its 
value is one if the principal owner owned private residence and zero otherwise. This indicates the 
ability of a small firm to obtain the loan, because the owner could use his own residence as the 
collateral to pledge for the approval of loan application, which might reduce the adverse 
selection problems in lending markets (Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005). 
3.4.4. Measuring Most Recent Loan Characteristics Variables 
As for the characteristics of most recent loan, the 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF provide a 
wealth of information as follows. The dummy variable APPLY indicates whether the firm had 
applied for its most recent loan in the past three years, and the dummy variable APPROVED 
indicates whether the firm’s most recent loan had been approved if applicable. Previous studies 
(Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002) discuss the importance of analyzing 
the differences in application rates across demographic groups, and argue that these differences 
will “reflect differences in risk preferences, differences in use of informal networks (for example, 
family) over formal financial markets, and/or feedback effects of past discrimination” 
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(Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998, p.778). 
When the most recent loan had been approved, the variable AMTAPPLIED indicates the 
dollar amount for which the firm applied, and the variable AMTGRANTED indicates the dollar 
amount of credit granted by the lender. One aggregated dummy variable FULLAPPROVED 
indicates whether the most recent loan for the firm had been fully approved, whose value is one 
if the dollar amount of credit granted by the lender is equal or more than the dollar amount for 
which the firm applied and zero otherwise.  
3.4.5. Other Control Variables 
Other control variables in this study include three types of dummy variables. The first group 
has three year dummy variables, 1993, 1998, and 2003, indicating the year of observations for 
each survey. The next has nine industry dummy variables, SIC1, SIC2, SIC3, SIC4, SIC5, SIC6, 
SIC7, SIC8, and SIC9, which are based on groupings of two-digit SIC codes. These variables are 
included because of the industry effects on small business financing, such as the determination of 
loan rate (Berger and Udell, 1995). The third has nine region dummy variables, REG1, REG2, 
REG3, REG4, REG5, REG6, REG7, REG8, and REG9, for census region controls. Based on the 
1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF, these areas indicate East North Central, East South Central, Middle 
Atlantic, Mountain, New England, Pacific, South Atlantic, West North Central, and West South 













In order to explore the relationship between family ownership, firm owner’s visible minority, 
and various measures of small business debt financing, a series of multivariate models are 
developed.  
4.1. Models for the Use of Debt 
The first model examines whether family and visible minority involvements directly affect 
the use of debt financing in small businesses (Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis 2). The ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model has the following form: 
                
 
        
 
          
 
                  
                 
 
                     
 
                        
                 
 
                                                    (1) 
where the control variables are represented by two separate groups. The first group includes the 
variables OWNMANAGE, OWNERSHARE, USEOWNERCC, FINSTATEMENT, RELATION, 
DISTANCE, FIRMAGE, EMPLOYEES, OWNERS, two organization forms SOLEPROP and 
PARTNERSHIP, METROPOLITAN, SITES, SAMESITES, LNASSETS, DBSCORE, FEMALE, 
OWNERAGE, EXPERIENCE, four levels of education NOTFINIHS, HIGHSCHDIP, 
BACHELORDEG, and POSTGRAD, and OWNHOME. The second group adds two financial 
variables PROFASSETS and SALEASSETS into the control variables. The purpose is to 
examine whether the differences in control variables result in the different influences on the use 
of debt financing in small businesses, and how they work if applicable. Thus, two versions of 
Model (1) are estimated in the analysis. 
The second model aims to examine whether the interactions between family ownership and 
firm owner’s visible minority also affect the use of debt financing in small businesses. In 
particular, we use the variable FBNONVM as our comparison basis to test the interactive effects 
(Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 4a). Consistent with Model (1), this model also has two sets of 
control variables, and thus is estimated in two versions. It has the following form: 
29 
 
                 
 
      
 
         
 
           
                
 
                   
 
                    
                
 
                       +  
 
                         (2) 
Especially, the 2003 SSBF provides two separate types of variables, one for each of the 
characteristics of the owner individual and firm level. These firm level characteristics are a 
weighted average of the characteristics of the individual owners weighted by their ownership 
shares. Thus, the third model is developed to compare the effects of the two types of 
characteristics on the use of debt financing in small businesses. By using the 2003 data only, this 
model has the following form: 
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where the control variables for each set of independent variables are in accordance with those in 
Models (1) and (2). However, to be best to capture the effects of two characteristics of the owner 
individual and firm level, the control variables must stand at the same level as the independent 
variables. Thus, the variables FBVM, NONFBVM, and NONFBNONVM are estimated with the 
variables OWNMANAGE, OWNERSHARE2, FEMALE, OWNERAGE2, EXPERIENCE2, 
NOTFINIHS2, HIGHSCHDIP2, BACHELORDEG2, and POSTGRAD2 in the owners’ firm 
level, whereas the variables FBVM2, NONFBVM2, and NONFBNONVM2 are estimated with 
the variables OWNMANAGE2, OWNERSHARE, FEMALE2, OWNAGE, EXPERIENCE, 
NOTFINIHS, HIGHSCHDIP, BACHELORDEG, and POSTGRAD in the owner individual level, 
all else are equal. Since each set of independent variables is accompanied with two sets of 
control variables, Model (3) is estimated in four different versions. 
4.2. Models for the Cost of Debt 
As addressed in the previous section, the fourth model examines whether family and visible 
minority involvements directly affect the cost of debt financing in small businesses (Hypothesis 
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5 and Hypothesis 6). The OLS model has the following form:  
                 
 
        
 
          
 
                  
                 
 
                      
 
                       
                  
 
                                                   (4) 
where the control variables are represented by three separate groups. The first group includes the 
variables DISTANCE, FIRMAGE, EMPLOYEES, two organization forms SOLEPROP and 
PARTNERSHIP, METROPOLITAN, SITES, SAMESITES, LNASSETS, OWNERAGE, 
EXPERIENCE, four levels of education NOTFINIHS, HIGHSCHDIP, BACHELORDEG, and 
POSTGRAD, and OWNHOME. To be consistent with the estimation for the use of debt 
financing, we also add variables OWNMANAGE, OWNERSHARE, USEOWNERCC, 
FINSTATEMENT, RELATION, OWNERS, and DBSCORE as our second group of control 
variables. And the variables PROFASSETS and SALEASSETS are added as the third group. 
Thus, Model (4) is estimated in three versions. 
The fifth model examines whether the interactions between family ownership and firm 
owner’s visible minority affect the cost of debt financing in small businesses. Consistent with the 
use of debt financing, we also use the variable FBNONVM as our comparison basis to test the 
interactive effects on the cost of debt financing (Hypothesis 7a and Hypothesis 8a). This model 
also has three sets of control variables as Model (4), and thus is estimated in three versions. It has 
the following form: 
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By using the 2003 data only, the sixth model explores the effects of the two characteristics 
of the owner individual and firm level on the cost of debt financing. Similar to Model (3), this 
model also has three sets of control variables, which are in accordance with the ones in Models 
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(4) and (5), for each set of independent variables, and thus is estimated in six different versions. 
Its form is as follows: 
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4.3.Model Specifications 
For each aspect of the small business debt financing that we examine, we compare results 
from four specifications of each model. The first is a baseline model that is described as previous. 
It captures the most common characteristics in small business debt financing. The second 
specification augments the first with the condition that there is no sole proprietorships firm in the 
estimation, because a sole proprietorships firm is excluded from the classical definition of a 
family business. The third specification augments the first with the demand constraints in credit 
markets. We add the condition that a firm had received a loan for at least the same amount as it 
applied into the baseline mode. This condition could be represented by the variable 
FULLAPPROVED. In a fully approved loan setting, small firms may mainly differ from each 
other in the term of interest rates charged on their loans. The presence of different interest rates 
will cause small firms to hold different amounts of loan. In turn, the loan difference will induce 
small firms to use different levels of debt. Therefore, the change in interest rates with respect to 
the demand constraints results in more or less debt for small businesses. The demand constraints 
thus would help us clarify the interactive effects of family ownership and firm owner’s visible 
minority on small business debt financing. Finally, we combine these two conditions together as 
our fourth specification. These specifications provide an opportunity to thoroughly evaluate 






5. Empirical Results and Robustness Checks 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics based on the full sample with 12,434 firms. It 
provides information on the use of debt and the cost of debt financing, firm and owner 
characteristics, and information on the firm’s most recent loan. The means and standard 
deviations of all the variables are presented in Panel A. The average liability ratio was 37.4%, 
and the fixed nominal interest rate charged on the most recent loan had a mean of 8.2%, which is 
significant higher than the average risk free rate of 3.2% during the same period. Family firms 
took up to 83.2% of the sample, while visible minority owned firms had 18.6%. 86.7% of the 
sample firms were owner-managed. The principal owner had an average 77.1% of ownership. 41% 
of the sample firms had used owner’s personal credit card to pay for business, and 22.6% had the 
audited financial statement or accounting reports. The average relationship between lender and 
borrower was 98.2 months, and their average distance was 75.7 miles.  
The average age of the firms was 15.5 years, and the average numbers of total employees 
and total owners were 31 and 9.5, respectively. 34.3% of the sample firms were operated in the 
legal form of sole proprietorship, 7.3% were in the form of partnership, and the rest 58.4% were 
in the form of corporation. 79.1% of the sample firms sited in a metropolitan. The average 
number of offices a firm had was 2.1, and the average number of offices that sited in the same 
city as the main office was 1.3. The average value of total assets of the firms was 2,031,203 
dollars. The ratios of profits and sales to total assets were 3.6 and 11, respectively. The average 
Dun and Bradstreet credit score was 3.48, indicating the risk neutral for the overall small 
businesses. 19.6% of the sample firms were owned by female. The average age of the principal 
owners was 51.4 years, and the average experience of the principal owners in business was 20.3 
years. 22.3% of the principal owners had received the high school education or less, and more 
than 77% had some form of post-secondary education. 90.1% of the principal owners owned 
personal residence. As to the firm’s most recent loan information, 39.1% of the sample firms had 
applied for their loans in the past three years. Among the firms that applied for their loans, 87.4% 
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of the applications had been approved, and 91.5% of the approved loans had received the full 
loan amount as they applied for. 
[Insert Panel A of Table 2 about here] 
Panel B and Panel C display the comparisons of variables for two separate versions, one for 
each of the two independent variables FAMILY and MINORITY, respectively. The results are 
based on the univariate tests, and reported with the T-test analysis for the differences between 
mean values of these variables. Obviously, the use of debt financing in small businesses was 
significantly different between family and non-family firms, and also between visible minority 
and non-visible minority owned firms, at the 1% level. The family firms had a lower liability 
ratio of 35.7% than the non-family firms of 45.5%, and the visible minority firms also had a 
lower liability ratio of 35.1% than the non-visible minority firms of 37.9%. These suggest that, 
family firms have the lower level of debt than non-family firms on average, and visible minority 
owned firms are also less of debt than non-visible minority owned firms. The cost of debt 
financing was significantly different between visible minority and non-visible minority owned 
firms at the 1% level, but it was indifferent between family and non-family firms. The average 
interest rate charged on visible minority owned firms was around 1.5% higher than that on 
non-visible minority owned firms, which indicates that visible minority owned firms are charged 
higher interest rates relative to non-visible minority owned firms. 
[Insert Panels B and C of Table 2 about here] 
Panel B shows that 19.7% of family firms and 12.8% of non-family firms were visible 
minority owned firms, and it was significantly different at the 1% level. This indicates that firm 
owner’s visible minority may be more involved under family ownership. The comparisons for 
the differences in control variables are as follows. 88.3% of family firms and 78.8% of 
non-family firms were owner-managed. The principal owner had an average 83.3% of ownership 
in family firms and 45.5% in non-family firms. 42.7% of family firms and 32.6% of non-family 
firms had used owner’s personal credit card to pay for business, and 21.2% of family firms and 
28.8% of non-family firms had the audited financial statement or accounting reports. The 
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average relationship between lender and borrower was 99.8 months in family firms and 93 
months in non-family firms.  
The average number of total employees was 26 in family firms and 56 in non-family firms. 
The average number of total owners was 3.8 in family firms and 37.7 in non-family firms. 78.4% 
of family firms and 82.4% of non-family firms sited in a metropolitan. The average value of total 
assets was 1,538,811 dollars in family firms and 4,508,897 dollars in non-family firms. The 
average Dun and Bradstreet credit score was 3.46 in family firms and 3.58 in non-family firms. 
21.3% of family firms and 10.6% of non-family firms were owned by female. The average age of 
the principal owners was about 51 years in both family and non-family firms. All of the five 
education levels were significantly different between family firms and non-family firms. 89.7% 
of the principal owners in family firms and 92.1% in non-family firms owned personal residence. 
36.4% of family firms and 52.4% of non-family firms had applied for their loans in the past three 
years, and among them, 86.2% of applications in family firms and 91.6% in non-family firms 
had been approved. All the above were statistically significant. 
Panel C shows that 88.7% of visible minority owned firms and 82.4% of non-visible 
minority owned firms were family firms, and it was significantly different at the 1% level. This 
indicates the same argument as Panel B that firm owner’s visible minority may be highly 
correlated to family ownership. The followings present the comparisons for control variables. 
88.1% of visible minority owned firms and 86.4% of non-visible minority owned firms were 
owner-managed. The principal owner had an average 84.3% of ownership in visible minority 
owned firms and 75.5% in non-visible minority owned firms. 18.2% of visible minority owned 
firms and 23.5% of non-visible minority owned firms had the audited financial statement or 
accounting reports. The average relationship between lender and borrower was 70.3 months in 
visible minority owned firms and 100.9 months in non-visible minority owned firms. The 
average distance between lender and borrower was 107.2 miles in visible minority owned firms 
and 71.9 in non-visible minority owned firms.  
The average ages of visible minority owned firms and non-visible minority owned firms 
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were 11.7 and 16.2, respectively. The average number of total employees was 16.2 in visible 
minority owned firms and 33.8 in non-visible minority owned firms. The average number of total 
owners was 1.9 in visible minority owned firms and 10.35 in non-visible minority owned firms. 
89.6% of visible minority owned firms and 76.7% of non-visible minority owned firms sited in a 
metropolitan. The average value of total assets was 669,103 dollars in visible minority owned 
firms and 2,237,367 dollars in non-visible minority owned firms. The average Dun and 
Bradstreet credit score was 3.05 in visible minority owned firms and 3.55 in non-visible minority 
owned firms. 23.7% of visible minority owned firms and 18.6% of non-visible minority owned 
firms were owned by female. The average age of the principal owners was 48.4 in visible 
minority owned firms and 52 in non-visible minority owned firms. The average experience of the 
principal owners in business was 16.2 years in visible minority owned firms and 21.3 years in 
non-visible minority owned firms. 81.7% of the principal owners in visible minority owned firms 
and 91.7% in non-visible minority owned firms owned personal residence. 32.1% of visible 
minority owned firms and 40.5% of non-visible minority owned firms had applied for their loans 
in the past three years. Among them, 68.1% of applications in visible minority owned firms and 
90.8% in non-visible minority owned firms had been approved, and 86.7% of the approved loans 
in visible minority owned firms and 92.1% in non-visible minority owned firms had received the 
full loan amount. All the above were statistically significant.   
To investigate the interactive effects of family ownership and firm owner’s visible minority 
on small business debt financing, additional information was provided for the use of debt and the 
cost of debt financing with the T-test analysis. Panel D1 describes the variable USE OF DEBT 
under family and visible minority involvements. No matter the firm was visible minority owned 
or not, there were significantly different for the use of debt financing between family and 
non-family firms at the 1% level. The liability ratios of family and non-family firms were 33.9% 
and 44.2%, respectively, when the firms were all visible minority owned, and the ratios were 
36.2% and 45.8%, respectively, when the firms were all non-visible minority owned. This is 
consistent with the previous findings that family firms have a lower level of debt than non-family 
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firms. When the firms were all family owned, visible minority owned firms had a lower liability 
ratio 33.9% than non-visible minority owned firms 36.2%, significantly different at the 5% level. 
However, such difference did not exist when the firms were all non-family owned. This suggests 
the conditional findings that visible minority owned firms have the lower level of debt than 
non-visible minority owned firms only if these firms are all family owned.  
[Insert Panel D of Table 2 about here] 
Panel D2 describes the variable COST OF DEBT under family and visible minority 
involvements. When the firms were all visible minority owned, the average interest rate of 9.6% 
charged on family firms was higher than that of 8.5% charged on non-family firms, which was 
significantly different at the 10% level. But such difference did not exist when these firms were 
all non-visible minority owned. It suggests the conditional findings that family firms suffer 
higher interest rates than non-family firms only if these firms are all visible minority owned. 
When the firms were all family owned, the average interest rate charged on visible minority 
owned firms was 9.6%, while that charged on non-visible minority owned firms was 7.99%, 
which was significantly different at the 1% level. But such difference did not exist when the 
firms were all non-family owned. This leads to the conditional findings that visible minority 
owned firms suffer higher interest rates than non-visible minority owned firms only if these firms 
are all family owned.  
Furthermore, the effects of family ownership and firm owner’s visible minority on small 
business debt financing were analyzed in a fully approved loan setting (FULLAPPROVED=1). 
The sub-sample results were presented in Panels E1 and E2. Panel E1 shows the results for the 
variable USE OF DEBT. When the firms were all non-visible minority owned, family firms had 
a lower liability ratio 47.8% than non-family firms 52.5%, significantly different at the 1% level. 
However, such difference did not exist when the firms were all visible minority owned. This 
suggests the conditional findings that family firms have the lower level of debt than non-family 
firms only if these firms are all non-visible minority owned. In addition, there was no difference 
between visible minority and non-visible minority owned firms for the use of debt financing, no 
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matter the firms were family owned or not. Compared with the results in full sample, the liability 
ratios in fully approved sub-sample were about 1% higher. The liability ratios of family and 
non-family firms were 46.8% and 51%, respectively, when the firms were all visible minority 
owned, and the ratios were 47.8% and 52.5%, respectively, when the firms were all non-visible 
minority owned.  
[Insert Panel E of Table 2 about here] 
Panel E2 shows the results for the variable COST OF DEBT. When the firms were all 
family owned, the average interest rate charged on visible minority owned firms was 9.7%, while 
that charged on non-visible minority owned firms was 7.97%, which was significantly different 
at the 1% level. When the firms were all non-family owned, the average interest rate charged on 
visible minority owned firms was 9.1%, while that charged on non-visible minority owned firms 
was 8.02%, which was significantly different at the 5% level. Both of them indicate the 
unconditional findings that visible minority owned firms are charged higher interest rates than 
non-visible minority owned firms. However, there was no difference between family and 
non-family firms for the cost of debt financing, no matter the firms were visible minority owned 
or not.  
[Insert Panels A and B of Table 3 about here] 
In addition, Table 3 presents the pairwise correlations between each dependent variable and 
the independent variables, between each dependent variable and the control variables, and 
between each independent variable and the control variables, based on the univariate tests for the 
full sample. The results show that the dependent variable USE OF DEBT is highly correlated to 
all the independent variables, indicating that both family ownership and firm owner’s visible 
minority have a significant effect on the use of debt financing in small businesses. Whereas the 
dependent variable COST OF DEBT is highly correlated to the independent variables 
MINORITY, FBVM, and FBNONVM. It suggests that the cost of debt financing in small 
businesses is mainly affected by firm owner’s visible minority.  
5.2. Use of Debt 
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Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the results about the use of debt analysis based on Models (1), (2), 
and (3). They examined the amount of debt used across small businesses. Model (1) examined 
the direct effects of family ownership and firm owner’s visible minority on the use of debt 
financing, whereas Models (2) and (3) examined the second order effects of family ownership 
and firm owner’s visible minority using all three SSBF data sets and the most recent 2003 SSBF 
data set, respectively. Industry and region dummy variables were used for all model analysis, but 
their coefficients were not reported due to their overall mixed results. Year dummy variables 
were used in Models (1) and (2), but their coefficients were not reported, because nearly none of 
them were statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 provides the results about the direct effects of family and visible minority 
involvements on the use of debt financing. As discussed earlier, Model (1) was estimated for our 
four model specifications. Model (1.1) was our baseline model, and it presented the results for 
the full sample regressions. Whereas Models (1.2), (1.3), and (1.4) were estimated in different 
sub-samples, Model (1.2) was estimated with the condition that there was no sole proprietorship 
firm in the regressions (SOLEPROP=0), Model (1.3) was estimated with the demand constraints 
in credit markets (FULLAPPROVED=1), and Model (1.4) was estimated with our full 
specifications (SOLEPROP=0 & FULLAPPROVED=1). This is the same for all of the models in 
this study.  
As shown in the results of Model (1), our Hypothesis 2 is rejected. Firm owner’s visible 
minority does not have a significant impact on the level of debt used in small businesses. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the coefficients on FAMILY are statistically significant and negatively 
associated with the dependent variable USE OF DEBT. This indicates that family ownership is 
related to the lower level of debt, just like the findings in Panel B and Panel D1 of Table 2. 
However, traditional view argues that family firms tend to have a highly levered capital structure 
owing to family owner’s desire to hold the majority of control (Vos and Forlong, 1996). Mishra 
and McConaughy (1999) provide one possible explanation for this lower level of debt in family 
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firms. They suggest that family business owners are more likely to borrow less of debt because 
of the owner’s higher expected costs of debt. The more a firm borrows, the larger costs of debt it 
has. This is because higher debt levels increase the rollover risk of their debt and also the 
probability of financial distress. Another possible explanation is that family firms can be more 
successful, then they do not need to keep higher levels of debt, as long as there is enough cash 
flow in the firm. 
The coefficients on control variables show several important factors in small business debt 
financing. According to the results of Model (1), the coefficients on OWNERSHARE are 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that the level of debt increases with the principal 
owner’s ownership. The coefficients on USEOWNERCC are negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that the level of debt decreases when the business owner can use personal 
credit cards to pay business expenses. The coefficients on RELATIONS are all positive and 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the literature (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger 
and Udell, 1995, 2002) that a long-run relationship between the firm and its lender can make the 
small business obtain debt financing easier due to the resolve of informational asymmetry.  
The coefficients on FIRMAGE are all negative and statistically significant. They indicate 
that the level of debt decreases with the firm’s age. The older the firm is, the less it has the debt. 
Berger and Udell (1995) explain that by the accumulation of retained earnings over the business 
life cycle. Since such retained earnings can be used by small business owners to obtain a larger 
equity share, the owner’s equity increases over time. In turn, debt from the short-term loan and 
credit debt declines as the firm matures. The coefficients on SOLEPROP and PARTNERSHIP 
are negative and statistically significant. Both of them suggest that debt in either form of 
business seems to be less than that in a corporation. Consistent with the previous studies (Berger 
and Udell, 1998; Romano et al., 2001), the coefficients on LNASSETS are all positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that the level of debt increases with the firm’s assets. The 
coefficients on DBSCORE are all negative and statistically significant. Since higher credit score 
increases the risk of a firm, the firm with higher credit score may have the lower of debt in order 
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to avoid the higher risk. This is consistent with the previous studies (Diamond, 1989; Berger and 
Udell, 1995, 2002). The coefficients on SALEASSETS are positive and statistically significant, 
indicating the level of debt increases with the firm’s sales to assets ratio. Moreover, when there 
was no sole proprietorship firm (SOLEPROP=0), the results of Models (1.2) and (1.4) show that 
the coefficients on FEMALE are all negative and statistically significant, which indicates that the 
role of female has a negative impact on the level of debt.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 presents the results about the second order effects of family and visible minority 
involvements on the use of debt financing with the variable FBNONVM as the comparison basis. 
As illustrated in previous, Model (2) is estimated in two versions of control variables, but only 
reported for one of them, because their results are consistent. Similar to the findings in Model (1), 
Hypothesis 4a is rejected in Model (2). Firm owner’s visible minority does not have a significant 
impact on the level of debt used in small businesses, even under the condition that all the firms 
are family owned. The results of Model (2) also contradict Hypothesis 3a. The coefficients on 
NONFBNONVM are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that non-family firms have 
the higher level of debt than family firms, when these firms are all non-visible minority owned. 
This is consistent with the finding of Panel E1 of Table 2. One reason for this finding may be the 
use of social capital, as well as the impact of cultural values and environment. Chua et al. 
(forthcoming) suggest that social capital can help small business build credibility and thus obtain 
a higher level of debt financing from various resources, especially in family businesses, because 
family members’ social capital can be easily transmitted to family firm’s social capital (Arregle 
et al., 2007). Since culture has an influence on the configurations of social capital and 
networking styles (Tata and Prasad, 2010), borrowed social capital and cultural issues in general 
improve the small business’ performance. In this case, family involvement in ownership may 
make small business more likely to borrow their family members’ social capital, which leads to 
the lower level of debt in family business. 
Consistent with the findings of Model (1), the control variables in Model (2) show the same 
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factors that have significant impact on the level of debt in small businesses. These factors include 
the variables OWNERSHARE, USEOWNERCC, RELATION, FIRMAGE, SOLEPROP, 
PARTNERSHIP, LNASSETS, DBSCORE, and FEMALE.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
By using the most recent 2003 data set only, Table 6 also presents the results about the 
second order effects of family and visible minority involvements on the use of debt financing. It 
only reports for one version of control variables in Model (3). Since there were two 
characteristics of owner individual and firm level, the variable FBNONVM was used as the 
comparison basis in the owners’ firm level, whereas the variable FBNONVM2 was in the owner 
individual level. As shown in Model (3), the coefficients on NONFBNONVM and 
NONFBNONVM2 are positive and statistically significant, which contradict Hypothesis 3a 
again. This result is consistent with the findings in Model (2), suggesting that non-family firms 
have the higher level of debt than family firms, when these firms are all non-visible minority 
owned. Moreover, the results of Model (3) also reject out Hypothesis 4a. 
In addition to the consistent relationship between the use of debt financing and a series of 
control variables including RELATION, FIRMAGE, PARTNERSHIP, LNASSETS, and 
DBSCORE, the results of Model (3) also show that the coefficients on SAMESITES are all 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the more a firm has its offices, plants, or 
stores in the same area as its main office, the lower level of debt the firm has. The coefficients on 
OWNHOME are negative and statistically significant, which indicates that the level of debt 
decreases when the principal owner owned residence. This is because the owner could use 
personal residence as the collateral to pledge for the approval of loan application (Cavalluzzo 
and Wolken, 2005; Robb et al., 2009).  
To sum up, we have the conclusion that family ownership is negatively related to the use of 
debt financing, and family firms have a lower level of debt than non-family firms when these 
firms are all non-visible minority owned. However, there is no evidence for the effects of firm 
owner’s visible minority on the use of debt financing in small businesses. Coefficients on the 
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control variables show that in small businesses, the level of debt is negatively related to the 
firm’s age and its credit score, whereas it is positively related to the relationship between the firm 
and its lender, and the firm size. 
5.3. Cost of Debt 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 present the results about the cost of debt analysis based on Models (4), (5), 
and (6). They examined the fixed interest rates charged across the demographic characteristics of 
small businesses. Model (4) examined the direct effects of family ownership and firm owner’s 
visible minority on the cost of debt financing, whereas Models (5) and (6) examined the second 
order effects of family ownership and visible minority using all three SSBF data sets and the 
most recent 2003 SSBF data set, respectively. Industry and region dummy variables were used 
for all model analysis, but their coefficients were not reported, because none of them were 
statistically significant. All of year dummy variables used in Models (4) and (5) were statistically 
significant, but not reported in the tables. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 presents the results about the direct effects of family and visible minority 
involvements on the cost of debt financing. In support of Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6, the 
results of Model (4) show that, the coefficients on FAMILY are statistically significant and 
negatively associated with the dependent variable COST OF DEBT, whereas the coefficient on 
MINORITY are statistically significant and positively associated with that variable. Both of them 
suggest that, family firms are charged a lower interest rate on their loans, whereas visible 
minority owned firms are charged a higher interest rate, which is consistent with the findings of 
Panel C and Panel E2 of Table 2. Consistent with the previous studies, Anderson et al. (2003) 
and Chua et al. (forthcoming) point out that family involvement can help family firm both 
directly and indirectly resolve the agency problems with lenders, which result in a lower cost of 
debt financing. Whereas previous empirical studies (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; 
Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Blanchflower et al., 2003) also demonstrate that minority owned firms 
pay a higher interest rate on their loans than whiter owned firms. Thus this is the evidence that 
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small businesses have experienced differently in credit markets, and the interest rates charged on 
their loans vary across demographic groups in small businesses. 
As shown in Model (4), the coefficients on DISTANCE are positive and statistically 
significant in Models (4.1) and (4.2), but become insignificant after controlling for the demand 
constraints. It suggests that to some extent, the interest rates increase with the distance between 
the firm and its lender. The coefficients on FIRMAGE are negative and statistically significant in 
Models (4.1) and (4.3), but become smaller and insignificant after we added the condition that 
there was no sole proprietorship firm (SOLEPROP=0). It suggests that the interest rates decrease 
with the firm’s age, especially in a sole proprietorship. One reason is that the firm has acquired a 
better reputation for its credit over time, and thus can obtain a lower interest rate on their loans 
(Diamond, 1989). The coefficients on LNASSETS are all negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that the interest rates decrease with the firm size. This is consistent with the previous 
studies (Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002) that the 
larger size of a firm incurs a lower cost of debt, because size can be used by lenders to measure a 
firm’s default risk. The coefficients on FEMALE are negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that female owned firms may be charged a lower interest rate on their loans. The 
coefficients on OWNERAGE are negative and statistically significant in Models (4.2) and (4.4), 
suggesting that the interest rates decrease with the principal owner’s age, especially when the 
firms are not owned by a single owner. Similar to the variable FIRMAGE, the coefficients on 
POSTGRAD and OWNHOME are all negative and statistically significant in Models (4.1) and 
(4.3). They indicate that both the principal owner’s education level and whether the owner 
owned personal residence have negative impacts on the interest rates charged on their loans, 
especially for the firms controlled by a single owner.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Table 8 presents the results about the second order effects of family and visible minority 
involvements on the cost of debt financing with the variable FBNONVM as the comparison basis. 
In support of Hypothesis 8a, the coefficients on FBVM are all positive and statistically 
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significant, suggesting that visible minority owned firms are charged a higher interest rate than 
non-visible minority owned firms, when these firms are all family owned. This is consistent with 
the findings of Panel D2 of Table 2. Also in support of Hypothesis 7a, the coefficients on 
NONFBNONVM are also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that non-family firms 
are charged a higher interest rate than family firms, when these firms are all non-visible minority 
owned. Both of the above provide the evidence that there are conditional racial effects on small 
business debt financing.  
In addition, the results of Model (5) also show the same factors that have significant impact 
on interest rates as the findings of Model (4). These factors include the variables FIRMAGE, 
LNASSETS, FEMALE, OWNERAGE, POSTGRAD, and OWNHOME.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Table 9 also presents the results about the second order effects of family and visible 
minority involvements on the cost of debt financing using the most recent 2003 data set only. 
Model (6) is estimated with our four model specifications, but only reported for the full 
specifications (SOLEPROP=0 & FULLAPPROVED=1), since the results are consistent. Same 
as Model (3), the variable FBNONVM was used as the comparison basis in the owners’ firm 
level, whereas the variable FBNONVM2 was in the owner individual level. As shown in Model 
(6), the coefficients on NONFBNONVM and NONFBNONVM2 are all positive and statistically 
significant. These results support Hypothesis 7a, and have the same argument as Model (5) that 
when the firms are all non-visible minority owned, non-family firms are charged a lower interest 
rate than family firms.  
In support of Hypothesis 8a, the coefficients on FBVM are positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level in the third column of Model (6.4.1). This suggests that firm owner’s 
visible minority has limited impact on the interest rates charged on their loans. With the passage 
of time from 1993 to 2003, the change in the effects of firm owner’s visible minority suggest that 
the racial disparities in small business credit markets have been reduced. One possible reason is 
that lenders adjust their strategies on loan origination for small businesses, and thus the lending 
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policy becomes more favorable to minority borrowers. Furthermore, compared with the results of 
Models (4) and (5), the coefficients on FEMALE in Model (6) become smaller and insignificant. 
This also suggests that the effects of minority on interest rates charged to them have been 
reduced. In addition, the control variables DISTANCE, FIRMAGE, and OWNHOME have been 
shown the same effects on the interest rates as the previous. 
To sum up, we find evidence that the family ownership is negatively related to the cost of 
debt financing (Hypothesis 5), and family firms pay a lower interest rate than non-family firms 
when these firms are all non-visible minority owned (Hypothesis 7a). We also find evidence that 
the firm owner’s visible minority are positively related to the cost of debt financing (Hypothesis 
6), and visible minority owned firms pay a higher interest rate than non-visible minority owned 
firms when these firms are all family owned (Hypothesis 8a). Thus, we have the conclusion that 
in credit markets, both of family ownership and firm owner’s visible minority have influence on 
the cost of small business debt financing. However, our results from the latest data show that the 
effects of firm owner’s visible minority have been reduced with the passage of time. It makes the 
evidence on the racial effects in small business credit markets not convincing enough. 
Coefficients on the control variables show that in small businesses, the interest rates charged on 
their loans are significant and negatively related to the firm’s age and whether the principal 
owner owned personal residence. 
5.4. Robustness Checks 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we do the following robustness checks. First, we 
change the independent variables in Models (2) and (5) to the variables FBVM, FBNONVM, and 
NONFBNONVM, so as to re-estimate the second order effects of family and visible minority 
involvements on the use of debt and the cost of debt financing, respectively, for our Hypotheses 
3b, 4b, 7b, and 8b. With the variable NONFBVM as the comparison basis, the results show that 
the coefficients of the independent variables are all negative, but none of them are statistically 
significant, although they are not reported in the table. These suggest that when the firms are all 
visible minority owned, it is indifferent between family and non-family firms, in terms of their 
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level of debt and the interest rates charged on their loans. In addition, when the firms are all 
non-family owned, it is also indifferent between visible minority and non-visible minority owned 
firms, in terms of their level of debt and the interest rates charged on their loans. Thus, 
Hypotheses 3b, 4b, 7b, and 8b are all rejected, because they are not significantly associated with 
the use of debt and the cost of debt financing in small businesses. 
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here] 
Second, we use the default risk to measure the cost of debt financing in small businesses. 
This variable COST OF DEBT2 is calculated by the fixed nominal interest rate that the firm paid 
at the time of issue of its most recent loan minus 90 day T-bill rate over the same period. Then 
we re-estimate Models (4) and (5). Table 10 presents the results about the direct effects of family 
ownership and firm owner’s visible minority on the cost of debt financing, whereas Table 11 
presents the results about the second order effects. According to them, the results are consistent 
with our previous findings. 
[Insert Tables 12 and 13 about here] 
Third, we re-estimate Models (1), (2), (4) and (5) in two different categories, one for 
corporations, the other for sole proprietorships and partnerships. With the demand constraints in 
credit markets (FULLAPPROVED=1), Table 12 presents the results about the effects of family 
ownership and firm owner’s visible minority on the use of debt financing, whereas Table 13 
about the cost of debt financing. When the firms are all corporations, the results are consistent 
with our fully sample regressions. However, when the firms are either sole proprietorships or 
partnerships, there is no effect of family ownership and firm owner’s visible minority on either 
the use of debt or the cost of debt financing. Thus, these results indicate that our findings in this 
study are favored by corporations rather than either sole proprietorships or partnerships. 
Fourth, this study uses the variable USE OF DEBT to measure the quantity of debt, and the 
variable COST OF DEBT to measure the price of debt, so that the quantity and the price of debt 
in this study are not determined simultaneously. In order to solve the potential omitted variables 
issue in the price-quantity relationships, we replace our original three year dummy variables 
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1993, 1998, and 2003 with the years that the firms applied for their most recent loans. According 
to the 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF, there are 15 year dummy variables in total to identify each 
firm’s application year. By re-estimating Models (1), (2), (4) and (5) with the 15 year dummy 
variables, the results are consistent with those reported in Tables 4, 5, 7 and 8. Therefore, 
although our dependent variables USE OF DEBT and COST OF DEBT do not measure the 
quantity and the price of debt at the same time, the findings in this study remain valid. 
Furthermore, since the significant correlation between some of the independent and control 
variables may cause multicollinearity, we estimate the variance inflation factors (VIFs) in all of 
our regression models in order to minimize this potential problem. As a rule of thumb, 
multicollinearity may not be a serious problem if the value of VIF for variables does not exceed 
10. Thus, there is no evidence of serious multicollinearity in this study as all the VIFs in our 


















6. Conclusions and Limitations 
Debt financing is one of the main sources of capital for small businesses. Current theory of 
debt financing does not only focus on the amount of debt used by small firms in their capital 
structure, but also the interest rates charged to these small firms. In this paper, we review the 
agency cost and small business literatures to argue that not only family involvement, but also 
racial disparity has an influence on small business debt financing.  
In the empirical tests, we use data from the 1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBF to examine the 
interactive effects of family and minority ownership on different aspects of small business debt 
financing. Our analysis finds significant evidence that family ownership has an impact on both 
the use of debt and the cost of debt financing in small businesses. That is, family ownership are 
negatively related to both the use of debt and the cost of debt financing (Hypothesis 5), and when 
the firms are all non-visible minority owned, family firms have a lower level of debt and pay a 
lower interest rate than non-family firms (Hypothesis 7a). We also find that the firm owner’s 
visible minority are positively related to the cost of debt (Hypothesis 6), and when these firms 
are all family owned, visible minority owned firms pay a higher interest rate than non-visible 
minority owned firms (Hypothesis 8a). However, the results by using the most recent 2003 data 
alone appear to be insignificant for the racial effects on the cost of debt financing. In addition, we 
find more robust evidence that our findings in this study are more favorable to corporations. 
These findings also have important implications for both small business and family business 
research. Since family involvement affects both the use of debt and the cost of debt financing, 
research on small business cannot ignore the family involvement. For small business owners, it is 
important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of family involvement to finance their 
small businesses. Furthermore, it also can help the policymakers and institutional lenders make 
financing decisions on small business loans based on the analysis of family involvement. On the 
other hand, the indications that the interest rate charged to the small business depends on the firm 
owner’s visible minority imply that small businesses across demographic groups experience 
great differently in credit markets. It advises the visible minority owners in small businesses how 
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to get a loan with their racial characteristics. And for policymakers and institutional lenders, 
understanding the racial effects also assists small businesses in obtaining debt financing.  
Our study has several limitations. First, we treat all the minority races as a whole, rather 
than consider the disparities in different races. Since different races may have different 
preferences for their use of debt financing, and also may suffer different costs of debt financing, 
our results may be biased for some racial groups. Thus future research can be performed along 
this route. With the separation into different races, the interactive effects of family and minority 
ownership may be different. And it could have a better explanation for racial disparities on small 
business debt financing. Second, we may never have sufficient control variables for estimation. 
Thus it is possible that some unknown factor would have an influence on the small business debt 
financing. Third, we are unable to verify the self-reported data, since information on identifying 
each sample firm is not available to us. Take the Dum and Bradstreet credit score for example, 
the variable DBSCORE in our study is only available in the survey years 1998 and 2003. Even 
the Dum and Bradstreet provides the credit scores for the firms in the 1993 SSBF, we cannot 
match them to our sample firms due to the lack of firm identities. Thus, our results for the 
regressions with the variable DBSCORE in this study only take the survey years 1998 and 2003 
into considerations. Furthermore, we cannot estimate our models in a panel setting, because our 
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 USE OF DEBT Total liabilities/total assets. 
 COST OF DEBT Fixed nominal interest rate that the firm paid at the time of issue of its 
most recent loan in the past three years. 
Independent Variables 
 FAMILY Equal to one if the firm was more than 50% owned by a single family 
and zero otherwise. 
 MINORITY Equal to one if the firm was more than 50% owned by individuals who 
were visible minorities and zero otherwise. 
 MINORITY2 Equal to one if the firm’s principal owner was a visible minority and 
zero otherwise. 
 FBVM (2) Equal to one if the firm was both family and visible minority owned 
and zero otherwise. 
 FBNONVM (2) Equal to one if the firm was family owned, but not visible minority 
owned, and zero otherwise. 
 NONFBVM (2) Equal to one if the firm was visible minority owned, but not family 
owned, and zero otherwise. 
 NONFBNONVM 
(2) 
Equal to one if the firm was neither family nor visible minority owned 
and zero otherwise. 
Control Variables 
 Agency Variables 
  OWNMANAGE Equal to one if there was at least one owner responsible for the daily 
management of the business and zero otherwise. 
  OWNMANAGE2 Equal to one if the principal owner was also the manager of the firm 
and zero otherwise.  
  OWNERSHARE Indicates the percentage ownership held by the principal owner. 
  OWNERSHARE2 Equal to one if any one individual or company owned 10 percent or 
more of the share in this firm and zero otherwise. 
  USEOWNERCC Equal to one if the firm used owner’s personal credit cards to pay 
business expenses and zero otherwise. 
  FINSTATMENT Equal to one if the financial statements or accounting reports for the 
firm were audited and zero otherwise. 
  RELATION Indicates the length of a firm had conducted business with its lender at 
the time of application for its most recent loan. 










 Firm Characteristics 
  FIRMAGE Indicates the firm’s age at the time of the survey. 
  EMPLOYEES Indicates the total number of owners and employees working in the 
firm. 
  OWNERS Indicates the number of owners in the firm. 
  SOLEPROP Equal to one if the firm was organized as a sole proprietorship and 
zero otherwise. 
  PARTNERSHIP Equal to one if the firm was organized as a partnership and zero 
otherwise. 
  CORPRATION Equal to one if the firm was organized as a corporation and zero 
otherwise. 
  METROPOLITAN Equal to one if the main office of the firm was in a metropolitan and 
zero otherwise. 
  SITES Indicates the number of sites that a firm had. 
  SAMESITES Indicates the number of sites that a firm had in the same area as its 
main office. 
  ASSETS Indicates the dollar amount of total assets. 
  LNASSETS Natural logarithm of the sum of total assets plus one. 
  PROFASSETS Profits/ total assets. 
  SALEASSETS Sales/total assets. 
  DBSCORE Indicates the firm’s credit score percentile created by Dum and 
Bradstreet. 
 Most Recent Loan Characteristics 
  APPLY Equal to one if the firm had applied for its most recent loan in the past 
three years and zero otherwise. 
  APPROVED Equal to one if the firm’s most recent loan had been approved and 
zero otherwise. 
  AMTAPPLIED Indicates the dollar amount for which the firm applied. 
  AMTGRANTED Indicates the dollar amount of credit granted by the lender. 
  FULLAPPROVED Equal to one if the dollar amount of credit granted by the lender is 













 Owner Attributes 
  FEMALE Equal to one if the firm was more than 50% owned by individuals 
who were female and zero otherwise. 
  FEMALE2 Equal to one if the firm’s principal owner was female and zero 
otherwise. 
  OWNERAGE Indicates the age of the principal owner. 
  OWNERAGE2 Indicates the average age of three principal owners. 
  EXPERIENCE Indicates the number of years of experience that the principal owner 
has had owning or managing a business. 
  EXPERIENCE2 Indicates the average number of years of experience that three 
principal owners have had owning or managing a business. 





Indicates the principal owner’s education level. Equal to one if the 
principal owner’s highest education level was lower than high school 
degree, high school graduated or equivalent, some college or training 
school but no degree granted, bachelor degree like BA, BS, AB, etc., 
and post graduate degree like MBA, MS, MA, Phd, JD, MD, DDS, 
etc., respectively, and zero otherwise. 





Indicates the average education level of three principal owners. Equal 
to one if the average highest education level of three principal owner 
was lower than high school degree, high school graduated or 
equivalent, some college or training school but no degree granted, 
bachelor degree like BA, BS, AB, etc., and post graduate degree like 
MBA, MS, MA, Phd, JD, MD, DDS, etc., respectively, and zero 
otherwise. 
 OWNHOME Equal to one if the principal owner owned private residence and zero 
otherwise. 
Additional Controls 
  1993, 1998, and 
2003 
Indicates the year of observations for each survey. 
  SIC1-SIC9 Indicates the industry controls based on grouping of two-digit SIC 
codes. 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A presents the summary statistics based on the full sample with 12,434 firms. 
 
Panel B and Panel C show the comparisons of variables for two separate versions, one for each 
of the two independent variables FAMILY and MINORITY, respectively. The results are reported 
with the T-test analysis for the differences between mean values of these variables.  
 
Panel D1 and Panel D2 describe the means and standard deviations for the dependent variables 
USE OF DEBT and COST OF DEBT, respectively, under family and visible minority 
involvements, based on the full sample. The results are reported with the T-test analysis. 
 
Panel E1 and Panel E2 describe the means and standard deviations for the dependent variables 
USE OF DEBT and COST OF DEBT, respectively, under family and visible minority 
involvements, based on a fully approved sub-sample (FULLAPPROVED=1). The results are 





















Panel D. Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables 
 
 
Panel D1. Descriptive Statistics for the variable USE OF DEBT 
 
 
N=10027 FAMILY Non-FAMILY T-test 
MINORITY 
Mean 0.339 0.442 
4.746*** Std.Dev. 0.298 0.293 
N 1635 211 
Non-MINORITY 
Mean 0.362 0.458 
11.079*** Std.Dev. 0.300 0.293 
N 6753 1428 
 
T-test 2.762** 0.750 
  




Panel D2. Descriptive Statistics for the variable COST OF DEBT 
 
 
N=1981 FAMILY Non-FAMILY T-test 
MINORITY 
Mean 9.641 8.538 
-1.730* Std.Dev. 3.770 2.809 
N 244 38 
Non-MINORITY 
Mean 7.992 8.072 
0.485 Std.Dev. 2.787 2.659 
N 1350 349 
 
T-test -8.015*** -1.019 
  












Panel E. Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables 
in a fully approved sub-sample 
 
 
Panel E1. Descriptive Statistics for the variable USE OF DEBT 
in a fully approved sub-sample 
 
 
N=3088 FAMILY Non-FAMILY T-test 
MINORITY 
Mean 0.468 0.510 
0.998 Std.Dev. 0.281 0.287 
N 290 52 
Non-MINORITY 
Mean 0.478 0.525 
3.852*** Std.Dev. 0.273 0.267 
N 2104 642 
 
T-test 0.571 0.375 
  




Panel E2. Descriptive Statistics for the variable COST OF DEBT 
in a fully approved sub-sample 
 
 
N=1809 FAMILY Non-FAMILY T-test 
MINORITY 
Mean 9.705 9.056 
-0.897 Std.Dev. 3.817 2.790 
N 211 30 
Non-MINORITY 
Mean 7.969 8.022 
0.304 Std.Dev. 2.808 2.623 
N 1251 317 
 
T-test -7.844*** -2.054** 
  




Table 3. Univariate Analysis 
 
Panel A presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between each dependent variable and the 
independent variables. 
 
Panel B presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between each dependent variable and the 
control variables in columns two to three, and between each independent variable and the control 
variables in the following columns. 
 
 
Panel A.  
 
  USE OF DEBT COST OF DEBT 
FAMILY -0.121  *** 0.0307   
MINORITY -0.036  *** 0.1757 *** 
FBVM -0.0506 *** 0.1805 *** 
FBNONVM -0.0559 *** -0.1129 *** 
NONFBVM 0.0334 *** 0.0151   
NONFBNONVM 0.1148 *** -0.0231   















































































































Figure 1. Interactive Effects of Family and Minority Ownership  
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